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INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION
UNDER U.S. LAW:
DOES MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?
LouAnna C. Perkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding adequate solutions to wildlife conservation problems is rarely
simple or straightforward. In developing acceptable domestic conservation policies, a nation must balance competing economic, political,
biological and social concerns. When a wildlife problem is of international relevance, the range of competing interests is even broader. A
nation's wildlife policies must then take into account not only various
concerns of the nation's own citizenry, but also potential impacts on
foreign policy. In addition, economic, political and cultural needs and
values of the other nations whose interests are implicated must be
recognized and weighed in the balance.
The problem of dolphin mortality incidental to tuna fishing in the
eastern Pacific Ocean is a case in point. For reasons still not understood
by scientists, large schools of mature yellowfin tuna are often found in
association with herds of dolphins.' Fishermen take advantage of this

* J.D. 1994, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Most frequently found in association with yellowfin tuna are the spotted
dolphin, Stenella attenuata, and the spinner dolphin, Stenella longirostris. Less
frequently found are the common dolphin, Delphinus delphis, and occasionally, the striped dolphin, Stenella coeruleoalba, the roughtoothed dolphin, Steno bredanensis, the
bottlenose dolphin, Tursiops truncatus, and Fraser's dolphin, Lagenodelphis hosei.
COMMITTEE ONPORPOISE MORTALITY FROM TUNA FISHING, NATIONALRESEARCHCOUNCIL, REDUCING DOLPHIN MORTALITY FROM TUNA FISHING 6 (1992), reprintedin Review
of the Administration'sDolphinProtectionProposalandDiscussionof OptionsAvailable

to Help Reduce DolphinMortality, 1992: HearingBefore the Subcomm. of Fisheriesand
Wildlife Conservationandthe Environmentof the House Comm. on MerchantMarine and
Fisheries, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 117 (1992) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
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association by encircling the dolphins with nets, trapping both the
dolphins and the tuna underneath. Initially, such "fishing on dolphins"
caused hundreds of thousands of dolphins to drown after becoming
entangled.
Although special nets and fishing techniques have been adopted over
the last decade to substantially reduce incidental mortality, thousands of
dolphins are still killed each year in the eastern Pacific Ocean tuna
fishery. The problem is of grave concern to fishermen, scientists and the
global citizenry. However, because tuna fishing in this area occurs on
the high seas, no one nation has jurisdiction to establish universal
dolphin-protective rules. Instead, under customary international law each
nation regulates the activity of its own fishermen, except where the
nations involved have agreed to adopt regulations established by an
international organization.
The United States first addressed the dolphin by-catch problem with
the enactment of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA),2
which attempted to balance the need for dolphin protection with the
economic interests of U.S. tuna fishermen. Over the succeeding years,
various provisions in the MMPA were strengthened and new provisions
were adopted in an attempt to reduce to insignificant levels the number
of dolphins incidentally killed during tuna fishing. Among these were
provisions for trade embargoes to enforce U.S. dolphin protection
standards in non-U.S. tuna fisheries.
The United States has also tried to develop an international solution
to the problem through its participation in the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC).' For example, in an agreement entered into
in 1992 with eight other member nations, the United States affirmed its
commitment to reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean
through a "multilateral program with the objectives of (1) ...reducing

2. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1361-1421 (1994)).
3. The Commission was established for the purpose of studying tuna stocks of the
eastern Pacific and to develop recommendations for responsible exploitation of tuna

resources.

Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna

Commission, May 31, 1949-Mar. 3, 1950 U.S.-Costa Rica, 1 U.S.T. 230 [hereinafter

Tuna Commission Convention].
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seeking
[such] mortality ...to levels approaching zero ...and, (2) ...

ecologically sound means of capturing tunas." 4
Despite the success of the MMPA and IATTC programs in reducing
the dolphin mortality levels, dolphins were still being killed in the
eastern Pacific tuna fishery. For this reason, the U.S. Congress
responded to pressures to step up the pace of dolphin protection and
enacted the International Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) in 1992. 5
The IDCA imposes a five-year moratorium on fishing on dolphins and
allows the lifting of trade sanctions from those nations which were
embargoed under the MMPA if such nations agree to the moratorium. 6
In addition, the Act requires the posting of observers on all vessels
fishing for tuna in areas where there is a regular and significant
association between marine mammals and tuna; bans purse-seine fishing
on eastern spinner and coastal spotted dolphins; and forbids U.S. citizens
from selling, purchasing, transporting or shipping to the United States,
tuna caught in association with dolphins.7

The passage of the IDCA was not without controversy, however. A
strong faction of interested parties supported enforcement of the
progressive approach to reducing dolphin mortality that the IATTC
adopted. 8 The moratorium approach for dealing with the dolphin
mortality problem had previously been presented to and rejected by
Congress because of opposition from both the fishing industry and
environmentalists.' After environmental groups reversed their positions
and with strong endorsement of the IDCA by the Administration,

4. Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean
(EPO), (La Jolla, Cal., June 1992), 33 I.L.M. 936 (1994) [hereinafter La Jolla
Agreement].
5. Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425 (1992) (current version as codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993)).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a), 1415(a) (Supp. V 1993).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(d) (Supp. V 1993). See generally James Joseph, The TunaDolphin Controversyin the EasternPacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, and Political
Impacts, 25 OCEAN DEy. & INT'L L. 1 (1994). See discussion at notes 104-114 infra.
8. The agreement called for a progressive decrease in dolphin mortality levels
(DML) from 19,500 to fewer than 5000 over a period of seven years. The agreement
also established an International Review Panel which was charged with the responsibility
to monitor compliance with the provisions of the agreement, and a Scientific Advisory
Board to assist in research to modify current purse-seine technology and to seek
alternative means for harvesting yellowfin tuna. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 4. See
Joseph, supra note 7, at 13.
9. Joseph, supra note 7, at 12.
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Congress ultimately chose the moratorium approach.'" This decision
may have satisfied the desire for more urgent action but may be
counterproductive in terms of development of international legal norms
and perhaps ecologically as well.
The choice Congress made in 1992 raises several important questions
regarding international law. First, how should a state attempt to solve
an international wildlife conservation problem? Second, is a state's use
of its economic power to impose its point of view on more dependent
states valid under international law? Third, is such validity affected
when that point of view is shared by a majority of the states involved in
the problem? Finally, what approach to addressing conservation of
common resources best serves the purposes of the international legal
order?
Part II of this Comment will describe the political and economic
background of the dolphin by-catch controversy including an analysis of
U.S. attempts to reduce dolphin mortality by threat of trade sanctions
under domestic legislation. It will also examine the efforts of the
multilateral organization, IATTC, to reduce dolphin by-catch in the
Pacific tuna fishery. Part III sets forth the significant provisions of the
International Dolphin Conservation Act and discusses its legislative
history, in which Congress had a choice between a multilateral approach
and a unilateral trade sanctions approach. Part IV then analyzes these
approaches in light of applicable international law. This Comment will
conclude by asserting that of the two approaches presented to Congress
in 1992, IATTC's multilateral agreement ultimately would better serve
the interests of both the United States and the international legal order.
II. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES To
REDUCING DOLPHIN BY-CATCH MORTALITY

The United States has long been a major world market for tuna."
Even though U.S. consumption of purse-seined tuna has declined from
over 80% of the total catch in 1975 to just over 45% in 1987, the U.S.
market remains very important to all fleets in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 2
Historically, U.S. tuna canning corporations had two major sources of
raw tuna: they contracted with "independent" U.S. tuna fishermen to

10.

11.
12.

Id.
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 114.
Id.
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supply the tuna, or they owned and operated their own tuna fleets. This
pattern changed in the period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.
Increasingly, U.S. corporations obtained
their raw tuna on the interna13
tional market from the lowest bidder.
The change was due to a variety of factors. During this period, the
size of the international tuna purse-seine fleet and the number of nations
involved in tuna purse-seine fishing increased dramatically.'4 This put
U.S. tuna companies in a strong buyers' position. The companies no
longer needed to maintain corporate fleets or to lock themselves into
contracts with independent fishermen. The corporate vessels were sold,
often to nations with lower fuel and labor costs and more advantageous
tax climates.' 5
These changes in the U.S. tuna market placed independent operators
of domestic tuna boats at a competitive disadvantage. Operating costs of
these fishermen were higher than those of non-U.S. fishermen, and they
no longer could rely on long-term contracts to provide economic stability
in the uncertain world of fishing. In addition, the growing global tuna
harvest was holding down raw tuna prices and U.S. fishermen were for
the first time, competing with many new supply sources. 6

13.

Id.

14. Id. at 88. The increase in effort in the eastern Pacific Ocean might be
explained in part by the increase in coastal nations' jurisdiction over highly migratory
species within their EEZs. JOSEPH J. KALO, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 417 (1990).
Fishermen whose access to tuna in EEZs became restricted may have turned to the high

seas. However, a major factor in the increase, both within EEZs and on the high seas,
was economic incentive. Writing in 1976, Joseph and Greenough commented:
[M]ost tuna are caught because there exists a strong demand by people
willing to pay a high price. Fishermen of nations with developed fleets fish

for profit, not for food. They go after tuna because in the past it has
provided an opportunity to make a better return on investment than any
alternative undertaking.

Developing nations also see in tuna fishing an

opportunity for good returns to investment. In addition, to them it is a means
for earning foreign exchange, creating jobs, and building industry.
JAMES JOSEPH & JOSEPH W. GREENOUGH, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF TUNA,

PORPOISE, AND BILLFTSH: BIOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND POLFIcAL ASPECTS 26

15.

(1976).

NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 139.

16. Id. Other factors were also at work. According to one commentator:
During the 'tuna boom' of the late 1970s, the United States industry
overinvested in large purse seiners and overcommitted itself with debt

repayments. The tuna market promptly collapsed in the early 1980s; prices
fell, exchange rates moved against the industry, fuel prices rose and imports

from Asia (especially Thailand) became cheaper. Ship owners were faced
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The negative effects of these changes in market forces were
exacerbated by restrictions placed on U.S. fishermen by the MMPA.

The MMPA required fishermen to invest in the latest gear designed to
reduce dolphin entanglement and to institute new, more labor- and fuel-

intensive fishing techniques. In addition, the Act limited fishing in the
eastern Pacific Ocean by establishing annual quotas on incidental dolphin
take. The enforcement of these quotas resulted in the closure of the U.S.

yellowfin purse-seine fishery for part of the years 1976, 1977, and 1986.
Finally, political and economic pressure was put on the U.S. tuna
industry to end dolphin mortality associated with tuna fishing through the
efforts of interest groups who widely publicized the plight of the

dolphins.' 7 One by one, U.S.-based tuna canning corporations acceded
to the pressure of a consumer boycott of tuna, and made it their policy
to process only "dolphin-safe" tuna."8
The overall effect of these factors was that many U.S. tuna boats
were sold or reflagged to nations imposing fewer restrictions on their
flagships. 9 Other fishermen simply moved their operations from the

with high trans-shipment costs to foreign ports, higher than expected debt
servicing payments and fuel bills and a 30[%] fall in tuna prices. To cap it
all, El Nifto weather conditions [a unique ecological phenomenon in Latin
America that causes a temporary break in the food chain] resulted in poor
fishing conditions in the eastern tropical Pacific from 1982 to 1984 and
correspondingly improved fishing in the tropical Western Pacific.
B. Martin Tsamenyi, The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America: The Final
Chapterin United States Tuna Policy, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 183 n.1 (1989) (quoting
Waugh, Tuna Wars, PACIFIC ISLANDS MONTHLY 46 (June 1988)).
17. Kathleen Merryman, Cash-Registering Your Opinions: Consumer Boycotts
Have Opened Vast New Opportunitiesfor People to Apply Social, Economic and Political
Pressure Via Their Pocketbooks, NEWS TRIB., Mar. 2, 1994, at F3.
18. Id. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 746, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1992),
reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2919-2934. This political pressure ultimately resulted
in the passage of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385
(Supp. IV 1993).
19. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 78 (statement of James Joseph).
"Reflagging," also known as "adopting a flag of convenience" is the practice of
registering and operating a vessel under the flag of another nation. Nations to which
U.S. vessels have reflagged include Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Korea, Mexico, and
Vanuatu. Laura L. Lones, Note, The MarineMammal ProtectionAct andInternational
Protectionof Cetaceans:A UnilateralAttempt to Effectuate TransnationalConservation,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997, 1017 n.179 (1989) (quoting Transcript, West 57th:
Pacific Dolphins: Slaughter at Sea, at 10 (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 1, 1989).
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eastern Pacific to the South Pacific,' where tuna fishing is carried out
without fishing on dolphins.2" Consequently, the percentage of the total
yellowfin tuna harvest caught by U.S. vessels in the eastern Pacific
diminished from 86% in 1970 to 9% in 1991.'
The United States has not worked in isolation to solve the dolphin
by-catch problem. In addition to enacting the MMPA, the United States
has cooperated through the IATTC with a number of nations whose
fishermen harvest yellowfin tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean. As will
be seen, however, the original policy of the United States which
integrated two paths of attack-domestic legislation under the MMPA

Under international law, every nation, whether coastal or not, has the right to sail
ships under its flag on the high seas. Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, arts. 4-6, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315; 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, infra note 133, at arts. 90, 92, 94.
20. Tuna fishing in the South Pacific was not initially- without its problems for
fishermen, however. Most South Pacific tuna fishing occurs within the EEZs of the
South Pacific states. Because the United States (until 1992) did not recognize coastal
states' jurisdiction over highly migratory species, U.S. fishermen were legally free to
ignore the South Pacific states' licensing requirements. Furthermore, the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-76 (1988) provided for compensation for
U.S. tuna fishermen whose vessels were seized by coastal states for illegal fishing, and
for expenses incurred as a result of such seizures. Time and profits lost, however, were
not compensated. Tsamenyi, supra note 16, at 193-4.
The situation was relieved in 1987 with the negotiation of two agreements. The
Treaty on Fisheries (Certain Pacific Island States - United States: Treaty on Fisheries,
Apr. 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1048 (1987)) gave access to U.S. fishing vessels to certain
areas within the various states' EEZs upon certain conditions and payment by the U.S.
government of annual license applications, originally $1.75 million for the first thirty-five
vessels, $50,000 per vessel for the next five, and $60,000 per vessel after that. Id.at
1082-1089, Annex II. The concomitant economic assistance agreement (Agreement
Between United States (AID) and South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FAA) on
Economic Development Assistance, Apr. 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1091 (1987)) provided that
the United States would make annual cash payments of $10 million for five years, as part
an overall foreign aid program to the South Pacific states. See the South Pacific Tuna
Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 973 (1988) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1988) for the U.S. implementation of these agreements. As a result ofthese
agreements and their subsequent renewals, U.S. fishermen have access to the abundant
tuna resources of the South Pacific, provided they observe the fisheries laws and
regulations of the South Pacific states. H.R. REP. No. 746, pt. I, supra note 18, at
2923.
21. Id.
22. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 87. (Computations of U.S. yellowfin tuna
catch are derived from Table IlI of Joseph's remarks.)
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and international efforts through the IATTC-has changed to a policy

which puts domestic legislation at odds with other U.S. efforts in the
international arena.
A. The Marine Mammal ProtectionAct
Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 at

least in part as a response to tremendous public concern over the dolphin
slaughter associated with tuna fishing.' Although there was a general
consensus that dolphins needed "optimum protection," the Act was
clearly the result of compromises.24 The House Report accompanying

the Act noted that "[t]he Committee took pains in its consideration of this
bill to see that the legitimate needs of the tuna industry were not ignored,
while accepting the clear requirement that porpoises be given every
reasonable protection. "I

As originally enacted, the MMPA had two central strands. The first,
a "domestic" component aimed at activities over which the U.S.
government had jurisdiction, imposed a moratorium on the taking of

23. For the view that dolphin protection was a primary impetus for the MMPA,
see, e.g., American Tunaboat Assn. v. Baldridge, 738 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1984)
and Comm. for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
24. In describing the original MMPA, one commentator noted:
This law is a carefully evolved compromise. Under the skilled and highly
professional leadership of Congressman Dingell in the House and Senator
Hollings in the Senate, the Act became a balancing of conflicting political
pressures. It is not a preservationist/protectionist act on the one hand or a
maximum sustainable yield fishery type of management act on the other. The
interests of these factions and the traditional professional resource managers
in the middle are all reflected in the Act. This compromise, painfully
hammered out over a two year period left no one completely happy except
perhaps the marine mammals who were afforded a level of conservation
concern never before provided.
Marine Mammal Protection Act Improvement: Hearing on H.R. 4084 Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 270 (1981)
(statement of Milton M. Kaufmann, Director, Fund for Animals International Program
for Marine Mammals and Endangered Species).
25. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148.
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marine mammals.' The second, an "international" component intended
to address marine mammal protection in the global arena, directed the
Secretary of State to pursue renegotiation of existing international treaties
and to initiate new treaties to reflect the marine mammal management
principles of the Act.'
1. The Moratoriumand the Domestic Tuna Industry
The moratorium applied to all activities in U.S. waters as well as to
the activities of all U.S. nationals on the high seas.38 One important
exception, however, was a provision for the incidental taking of marine
mammals in the course of commercial fishing operations. This
exemption was designed to allow the tuna industry to continue operations
while working to eliminate dolphin mortality.29 It also granted fishermen
a special two-year waiver of the moratorium, during which time taking
of mammals was allowed, although subject to regulations requiring
fishing techniques which produced "the least practicable hazard to marine
mammals. "30 At the end of the two years, incidental take of marine
mammals could still continue, but would be subject to issuance of
permits and even more stringent regulation. 3 Notwithstanding this
commercial fisheries exemption, the goal to protect the dolphins was
emphasized: "[i]n any event it shall be the immediate goal that the
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.S.
§ 1371(a) (1994)). "Taking" is defined as harassing, hunting, capturing, killing, or
attempting to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal. 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
(1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (Supp. V 1993)).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.

§ 1378(a) (1988)).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.S. § 1371
(1994)); 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)
(1994).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.S.
§ 1371(a)(2) (1994)). The legislative history of the commercial fishing exemption reveals
great concern over dolphin mortality among environmental groups, the congressional
delegation, and among fishermen themselves. Testimony by commercial fishermen,
however, apparently convinced the legislators that recently developed fishing techniques
and gear modifications indicated that a solution to the mortality problem was imminent.
See H.R. REP. No. 707, supra note 25, at 4148.
30. Pub. L. No. 92-522, tit. I, § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1029 (1972) (current version
as codified and amended at 16 U.S.C.S. § 1371(a)(2) (1994)).

31. Pub. L. No. 92-522, tit. I, § 101(a)(3)(A), 86 Stat. 1029 (1972) (current
version as codified and amended at 16 U.S.C.S. § 1371(a)(2) (1994)).
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incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted
in the course of commercial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant
levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate. "32 Congress
did not, however, define "insignificant levels," nor did it indicate over
what time period the goal was to be attained.
The meaning of the MMPA in the context of commercial fishing was
the subject of significant disagreement in the 1970s. The Secretary of
Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
interpreted the exemption broadly, reading the statute to mean that
fishing was to continue, even where there was a lack of adequate
information concerning the factors to be considered in issuing general
permits.33
Litigation, lobbying of Congress, and active participation in
administrative proceedings ensued, as various interest groups-the fishing
industry and environmental and protectionist organizations-attempted to
influence the course of MMPA interpretation. 34 Some of these groups

32. Pub. L. No. 92-522, tit. I, § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1029 (1972) (current version
as codified and amended at 16 U.S.C.S. § 1371(a)(2) (1994)).
33. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1373(a)-(b) (1982) (current versions as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), for the factors to be considered in issuing
general permits.
34. NMFS issued the required general permits to the tuna industry, to be in effect
after expiration of the two-year exemption period, which initially set no quota for
incidental dolphin take. In Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, a number
of interest groups successfully challenged this action. The court held that the MMPA
had been violated, finding: 1) that the regulations had been promulgated without the
requisite underlying scientific findings; 2) that the permit did not include the requisite
specificity regarding number and kind of animals authorized to be taken; and 3) that the
permit application failed to make the requisite showing that the permit's issuance would
be consistent with the purposes of the Act. Comm. for Humane Legislation v.
Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 309-315 (D.D.C. 1976). The challenge was upheld on
appeal, although to protect the fishing industry, the court stayed the order until the end
of the year. Comm. for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d at 1151.
Once regulations establishing a quota were promulgated, members of the tuna
industry swiftly challenged their enforcement. See Motor Vessel Theresa Ann v.
Richardson, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20065 (S.D. Cal. 1976). The quota was
again the subject of litigation in Fund for Animals v. Kreps, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20456 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Meanwhile, the industry attempted, by remaining in port, to protest these regulatory
actions and to pressure Congress to amend the MMPA to legislatively fix the quota.
MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 310 (1983).

This

would eliminate the discretion of the Secretary and the avenues of legal challenge for the
protectionist groups. The House of Representatives responded by passing a bill to fix
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contended that the Act required the industry to halt its practice of setting
nets on dolphins until more adequate scientific data were available. The
tuna industry was concerned that the MMPA's ambiguous language about
"insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate"
might one day be strictly interpreted to mean actual elimination of
incidental take regardless of technological feasibility or economic
impact35
Congress addressed the problem by clarifying the zero mortality goal
in a 1981 amendment to the Act:
[P]rovided, that this goal shall be satisfied in the case of the
incidental taking of marine mammals in the course of purse
seine fishing for yellowfin tuna by a continuation of the
application of the best marine mammal safety techniques and
equipment that are economically and technologically
practicable."6
It does not appear that this clarification was intended to soften the intent
of the MMPA to provide protection for dolphins. The 1981 amendment
did not alter the Secretary's directive to finance and undertake research
into new methods of locating and catching yellowfin tuna without the
incidental taking of marine mammals.37 Also, the Secretary retained the
authority to establish quotas.38
The MMPA was again amended in 1984, providing even more
detailed mandates to be followed by the Secretary of Commerce in
issuing the general permits, and setting by statute the allowable quota of
the most threatened dolphin species.39 The amendment specifically
directed the Secretary to undertake certain scientific studies, and to
modify quotas and gear requirements as necessary "to ensure that the
marine mammal population stock is not significantly adversely affected

the quota. 123 CONG. REc. 17141-68 (1977). However, the Senate did not go along,

and the fishermen's boycott ended in mid-1977. BEAN at 310.
35. BEAN, supra note 34, at 310.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.S.
§ 1371(a)(2) (1994)).
37.
38.

16 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

39.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1371 (1982 & Supp.

M 1985)

(current version as amended at

16 U.S.C.S. § 1371 (1994)); 16 U.S.C. § 1374 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (current version

as amended at 16 U.S.C.S. § 1374 (1994)).
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'
by the incidental taking. "I
Despite these protections, high rates of
dolphin by-catch in the eastern Pacific Ocean continued. Between 1979
and 1988, the U.S. tuna fleet's take of dolphins generally ranged
between 8,000-20,000 per year.41 Congress recognized that the fishing
industry generally had made great strides in attempting to solve the
problem. However, there was a strong feeling that at least some U.S.
tuna vessels were not adequately reducing dolphin by-catch. Congress
reacted by further amending the Act in 1988. Congress took the unusual
step of detailing the specific regulations which were to be promulgated
by the Secretary.42 These included performance standards, 43 observer
requirements,' and a ban on "sundown sets."'45 In addition, the
Secretary was directed to undertake a scientific research project and was
required to submit a comprehensive report to Congress by 1992. This
report was to discuss the results of the regulations required by the
amendment and recommend legislation to accomplish the goals of the
Act.' Before 1988, such specifics had been left to the discretion of the
agencies.
The latest amendments to the MMPA, the International Dolphin
Conservation Act of 1992 (IDCA),47 are evidence of Congress'
continuing frustration with the domestic tuna fishing industry, notwithstanding the finding by the National Research Council that "no methods
of catching tuna without killing dolphins-currently available or capable
of rapid development-are as efficient as current methods of catching
large yellowfin tuna in the [Eastern Pacific]."I The IDCA flatly imposes
a moratorium on all fishing on dolphins beginning in 1994, unless no
other major tuna fishing nation agrees to such a moratorium. If no other
nations agree, the American Tunaboat Association (ATA) permit will be

40. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(3)(B) (Supp. M 1985 & 1988).
41. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 176.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B) (1988).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(vi) (1988).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(iv) (1988).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(iv) (1988).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(ix) (1988). The study was undertaken by the
National Research Council, whose report was not publicly released until February 27,
1992. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1.
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1411-1418 (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.S.
§ 1361 (1994)).
48. NRC REPORT, supranote 1, at 114.
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limited by an annual quota, beginning at 1000 in 1994.19 This quota will
be significantly reduced each year until 1999, after which the permit will
expire. 5°
2. The MMPA's InternationalProgram
Congress recognized in 1972 that although dolphin mortality in the
eastern Pacific was attributable primarily to U.S. vessels, fishing by nonU.S. vessels was increasing, and an international solution was called for.
Hence, the MMPA directed the Secretary of State to:
initiate negotiations with other nations, and particularly with all
foreign governments whose nationals engaged in commercial
fishing operations which were found to be harmful to any
species of marine mammal, for the purpose of entering into
bilateral or multilateral treaties in order to protect marine
mammals;
encourage the development of international agreements protecting specific regions significant to marine mammals;
initiate amendments to existing international treaties to which the
U.S. was a party, in order to make such treaties consistent with
the purposes of the MMPA; and
seek the convening of an international ministerial meeting to
negotiate a binding international convention for the protection
and conservation of marine mammals.5"
In addition, perhaps as an effort to "put some teeth" into the
negotiating position of the United States, the Act also provided for a ban
on the importation of fish or fish products caught with commercial
fishing methods that resulted in incidental kill or serious injury of marine
mammals in excess of U.S. standards.' The government of any nation
exporting fish or fish products to the United States was required under
49.
50.
51.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1416 (Supp. IV 1992).
16 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(2) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.

§ 1378(a)(2) (1988)).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2) (1982) (current version as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2) (1994)).
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this provision to provide "reasonable proof' of the effects on ocean
mammals of the commercial fishing technology used to catch the
exported product.5 3
The import ban provision was strengthened by the 1984 amendments
with the addition of a provision strictly aimed at yellowfin tuna caught
by purse-seine in the eastern Pacific Ocean. The new provision required
that in order to have access to U.S. markets, the exporting nation needed
to provide "documentary evidence" that:
1) the exporting nation had adopted a regulatory program
concerning incidental take of marine mammals that was
comparable to the U.S. program; and
2) the average rate of incidental take was comparable to the
average rate for U.S. vessels.'
This strengthened provision responded to a recognition that much of
the dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific was now attributable to nonU.S. fishing vessels.15 The Secretary of Commerce had promulgated
regulations for implementing the embargoes, 6 however, under these
regulations the Secretary had a significant amount of discretion.' The
1984 amendment was intended to address this problem by specifying the
documentation required of nations exporting tuna to the United States to
avoid a ban, and therefore placing pressure on foreign governments to
adopt tuna fishing regulations more protective of dolphins. 58
This congressional mandate, however, was largely ignored. No
NMFS regulations pursuant to the 1984 import ban provision were
promulgated until March 1988. Consequently, at a hearing on reauthorization of the MMPA in April 1988, legislators expressed even greater
impatience, both with the administration's delay in implementing the
strengthened import ban, and with continued dolphin mortality figures
attributable to non-U.S. fleets.5 9

53. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988).
55. H.R. REP. No. 758, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1984) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 639 [hereinafter 1984 Amendments].
56. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e) (1993).
57. Id.
58. 1984 Amendments, supranote 55, at 640-641.
59. Id. at 639.
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Not surprisingly, the 1988 amendments to the MMPA added a
number of measures targeted specifically at the non-U.S. purse-seine tuna
fishery in the eastern Pacific Ocean. First, the import ban was further
strengthened. Rather than giving the Secretary discretion to decide
whether the regulatory program of an eastern Pacific tuna harvesting
nation was comparable to that of the United States, the amendment
explicitly specified five elements of the program that must be present in
order for such nations to avoid embargo of their tuna products from U.S.
markets. 60 Second, when an embargo against a country's importation of
yellowfin tuna or tuna products into the United States has been in effect
for six months, the Secretary must certify this fact to the President. 6
Such certification brings the embargoed nation under the Pelly
Amendment, and initiates further sanctions.62 Third, intermediary
nations are now required to provide reasonable proof to the Secretary
that they have not imported, "within the preceding six months, any
yellowfin tuna or tuna products that are subject to a direct ban on
importation to the United States."63 Finally, the Secretary of State is
specifically directed to work through the IATTC or other appropriate
institutions in order to conclude international arrangements for the
conservation of marine mammals incidentally taken in tuna purseseines."

60.

16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(I-V) (1988).

61.

16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

62. This amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 provides that
whenever non-U.S. fishermen conduct "fishing operations in a manner or under
circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation
program," the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to certify this fact to the President,

who may then direct that importation of fish products from the offending nation be
prohibited "for such duration as he determines appropriate." 22 U.S.C § 1978(a) (1988).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "Intermediary nation"
is defined as "a nation that exports yellowfln tuna or yellowfin tuna products to the

United States and that imports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products that are subject
to a direct ban on importation into the United States pursuant to section 16 U.S.C.
1371(a)(2)(B)." 16 U.S.C. § 1362(17) (Supp. IV 1992).
The purpose of this provision was to prevent the selling by embargoed nations of
tuna to an intermediary nation which, in turn, sells the otherwise banned tuna to the
United States. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826, 832 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
64.

16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(2)(B) (1988).
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3. Earth Island Institute Cases
After the adoption of the 1988 amendments, the Secretary of
Commerce and the administrative agencies still did not exercise their
authority to impose embargoes. In fact, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) promulgated regulations which appeared to allow
circumvention of the strict provisions in the statute.A In addition, the
Department of Commerce, through NMFS, was exercising its own
discretion in some areas, rather than strictly adhering to the new
mandates. As a result of these actions, a coalition of marine mammal
protection groups brought two actions against the government in the
"Earth Island Institute" cases.
In the first of these cases, Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher (Earth
Island I)66 plaintiffs sought a court order to enforce the primary embargo
provisions of the MMPA. Plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of
Commerce had not made requisite findings that the average rate of
incidental taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels was comparable to the
average rate of U.S. vessels. Therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury
was required to ban importation of yellowfin tuna and tuna products from
Mexico. The government maintained that although the data had been
received, making the requisite findings would take several months. The
government argued that the MMPA did not require action until findings
had been made. The district court disagreed and ordered that the
embargo be imposed immediately, holding that the plain language of the
statute required an embargo until the NMFS had made the requisite
comparability finding.
In response, the government imposed the embargo. However, the
very next day, NMFS completed the findings and lifted it. NMFS found
that even though Mexico had exceeded the limits for both total dolphin
take and percentage of eastern spinner dolphins killed in 1989, the
embargo could be lifted because Mexico was within the limits on killing
eastern spinner dolphins for the first six months of 1990. This action
was based on NMFS' "reconsideration regulation," under which the
Secretary could reconsider an embargo and certify compliance with the

65. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5) (1993).
66. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) aff'd 746
F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Earth Island 1].
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statute's provisions based upon data for only the first six months
following the year the limits were exceeded.67
Earth Island Institute then challenged the "reconsideration regulation," arguing that under the statute, the comparability finding must be
based on an entire year of data. Again, the district court agreed and
invalidated the "reconsideration regulation."' The court also issued a
temporary restraining order banning the import of yellowfin tuna from
Mexico. This order was upheld by the 9th Circuit Court 6f Appeals,
with sharp criticism of the government's position:
Because the reconsideration regulation creates such a potential
for abuse, and has in fact already been used to circumvent the
intent of Congress, we reject the government's argument that the
reconsideration regulation offers a more effective incentive to
foreign countries to reduce dolphin kill rates.
The agency's contention that it seeks only to provide additional
incentives consistent with Congress' intent is further belied by
the agency's own record of non-enforcement of congressional
directives during the years which preceded the 1988 amendments.6 9
In the second case brought to compel enforcement of the embargo
provisions, Earth Island v. Mosbacher (EarthIsland H),o three aspects
of the intermediary nation embargo provisions were at issue. First,
which intermediary nations are required to submit proof of their import
policies to the Secretary of the Treasury? Second, what must be proved
in order to overcome the embargo? Finally, for intermediary nations
whose policies bring them under the embargo, what products are banned

67.

50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(vii) (1993).

68. Earth Island 1, 929 F.2d at 1451-1452. The regulation was subsequently
changed to establish more specific dates. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(vii) (1993).
69. EarthIsland1, 929 F.2d at 1453. This action resulted in Mexico challenging

whether the MMPA was consistent with provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in an appeal to a GATT Dispute Settlement Panel. Joseph, supra
note 7, at 9 (citing 'United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Request for the
Establishment of a Panel under Article XXIII-2 by Mexico' (Memorandum from the
Council of GATT, Jan. 25, 1991)). See discussion infra notes 79-84.
70.

785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter EarthIsland I].

230

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:213

from importation into the United States? The district court found the
71
answer to all three questions "by simple reference to the statute.
As to which nations must submit proof, the government argued that
the agency had discretion not to require formal government certifications
where there was no reason to suspect that a nation was importing tuna
from embargoed nations. The court found such discretion unwarranted,
however, because the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous:
"[t]he Secretary ... shall require the government of any intermediary
nation from which yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to
the United States to certify and provide reasonable proof. "I
Regarding the nature of proof, the government contended that an
intermediary nation would not be subject to the embargo if:
1) evidence had been received that the nation did not import
yellowfin tuna from the embargoed harvesting nations,
or
2) evidence were received that once the embargo was in
effect the nation no longer imported such tuna.'
Again relying on the plain wording of the statute, the court found the
government's interpretation faulty in two ways. First, the statute
requires an intermediary nation's prohibition of importation of certain
products, not merely a declaration that the nation does not or no longer
continues to import such products. 4 Second, the statute does not require
intermediary nations to prohibit the importation of all tuna products from
embargoed nations, but rather only those products that would be banned
from importation into the United States.7' In other words, the Congress
intended only to induce intermediary nations to adopt the same
prohibition the U.S. had adopted with regard to tuna and tuna products.
Finally, the court addressed the scope of the secondary embargo,
which the government had interpreted to be the same as that of the
primary embargo. Again finding the answer "by simple reference to the
statute," the court held that the secondary embargo encompasses a

71. Id. at 832. This phrase was repeated throughout the opinion, underscoring
the court's impatience with the government's apparent attempts to circumvent the

embargo provisions.
72. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1988)).
73. Id. at 834.
74.
75.

Id. at 833.
Id.
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broader range of products.76 That is, while the primary embargo only
prohibits importation of yeliowfin tuna and tuna products caught in purse
seines in the Eastern Pacific, the secondary embargo prohibits importation of all yellowfin tuna or tuna products, regardless of origin or
method of harvest.'
The evolution of MMPA mandates aimed at non-U.S. fishing on
dolphins in the eastern Pacific demonstrates a retreat from Congress's
initial focus on searching for an international, or multinational attempt
to solve the tuna-dolphin problem. In 1972, the focus of the international program was on negotiation with other nations, with only a
weakly-worded provision for economic sanctions against nations whose
marine mammal conservation programs did not parallel that of the United
States.7' By 1988, the focus had shifted to embargoes against both
primary and intermediary nations, in an effort to use economic sanctions
to force nations to aggressively attack the problem. While the 1988
amendments to the MMPA did provide for negotiations with other tuna
fishing nations through the IATTC, these negotiations were clearly
intended to be influenced by the threat of embargo.
During the years over which this shift took place, there is no
evidence in the legislative history that Congress questioned either the
propriety of the United States exercising its economic power to impose
the goals of the MMPA on other nations, or the effect such action would
have on multilateral efforts to reduce dolphin by-catch. The lack of
analysis of these issues is disconcerting, particularly in light of basic
principles of international law.

76. Id. at 833-834.
77. Id. at 833-835. The state of the law remains unclear, however. On appeal,
Earth Island 1I was reversed and the injunction vacated. The 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the District Court improperly exercised jurisdiction, stating that under
28 U.S.C. § 1581 the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over this
matter. Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 28 F.3d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1994). In any event,
primary and secondary embargoes have been imposed at least temporarily on more than
20 nations since August 1990. Joseph, supra note 7, at 7 (citing a letter from Dr.
William Fox, Jr., U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, dated Jan. 20, 1992 to Mr.
Bill Broward, Director, Office of Trade Operations, Dept. of Treasury, Wash., D.C.).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(A) (1988).
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B. The GATT Controversy
Shortly after Earth IslandI was decided, Mexico registered a protest
that embargoes imposed pursuant to the MMPA by the United States
violated provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).79 In an appeal to a GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, Mexico
alleged, among other things, that the embargoes were contrary to Article

XI of GATT because they were a "prohibition or restriction other than
duties, taxes or other charges .... Io The United States argued that its
actions were consistent with GATT principles because the MMPA applies
to both domestic and imported products, and thus the measures were
"internal regulations" exempted under Article 111.81

The GATT Panel dismissed this argument finding that the Article III
provisions covered only products as such, and that regulations governing

the incidental take of dolphins could not be considered products for these
purposes." The Panel decided in favor of Mexico and ruled that the
U.S. embargoes were contrary to GATT principles.' Further, the Panel
ruled that the United States had not considered all options for resolving
the controversy under GATT, because it had not attempted to negotiate

international cooperative agreements.'

79. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signatureOct. 30, 1947,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 *[hereinafter GATT]. The United States became a contracting party to
GATT by executive agreement. The Senate has never formally approved the GATT or
acted to implement it but it is widely regarded as a binding treaty obligation of the
United States. See Don Mayer & David Hoch, InternationalEnvironmental Protection
and the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 188 n.7 (1993).
80. GATT, supra note 79, art. XI:1, at 224-225. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the Mexico-United States GATT dispute, see Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave
& Garland Stephens, The GAIT-Tuna Dispute:An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957
(1993); Mayer & Hoch, supranote 77; John P. Manard, Jr., GAITandthe Environment:
The FrictionBetween InternationalTrade andthe World's Environment-The Dolphin and
Tuna Dispute, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 373 (1992).
8 1. GATT, supra note 79, art. Il, at 204-208. Article 11:2 requires that [t]he
products of the territory of any ... party [to GATT] shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin .... GATT, supra note
79, at 206.
82. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report
On United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1618 (1991).
83. Id. at 1623.
84. Id. at 1620.
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C. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
The IATTC commission was established in 1949 in a convention

originally entered into by the United States and Costa Rica.'
The
convention was left open to adherence by other eastern Pacific fishing
nations, and by 1993, seven nations were members. 6 Originally the
IATTC was charged with studying tuna and other species impacted by
tuna fishing vessels within its geographical area of responsibility, and
with recommending management measures designed to maintain stocks
at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yields.'
As other nations began to expand their fishing efforts in the eastern
Pacific Ocean in the early 1970s, the United States worked to have the
duties of the IATTC broadened to include dolphin conservation. In
1976, IATTC member nations resolved that "the Commission should
strive [1] to maintain a high level of tuna production and also [2] to
maintain [dolphin] stocks at or above levels that assure their survival in
perpetuity, [3] with every reasonable effort being made to avoid needless
or careless killing of [dolphins]."'
In carrying out these objectives, the IATTC initiated an "observer
program," to monitor fishing trips on non-U.S. vessels. 9 Additionally,
85. Tuna Commission Convention, supranote 3. The Convention is implemented
by the Tuna Convention Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C. §§ 951-961 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86. Current members of the IATTC are Costa Rica, Panama, Japan, France,
Nicaragua, Vanuatu, and the United States. Former members were Ecuador (1961-68),
Mexico (1964-78), and Canada (1968-84). In 1991 the IATTC passed a resolution
requesting that the United States initiate procedures to amend the Convention to make it
easier for eligible nations to join. IATTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
TROPICAL TUNA COMM'N 8 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 IATTC REPORT].
87. The initial impetus for establishing the IATTC was U.S. concern over baitfish and yellowfin tuna resources in the high seas of the Eastern Pacific Ocean. As the
major tuna harvesting nation in the Eastern Pacific at the end of World War II, the
United States had a strong interest in managing both tuna and the bait with which they
were caught. JOSEPH & GREENOUGH, supra note 14, at 13.
88. 1991 IATTC REPORT, supranote 86, at 7. The specific areas of involvement
of the Commission were to be "(1) monitoring population sizes and mortality incidental
to fishing through the collection of data aboard tuna purse seiners, (2)aerial surveys and
dolphin tagging, (3) analyses of indices of abundance of dolphins and computer
simulation studies, and.(4) gear and behavioral research and education." Id.
89. Initially, the IATTC lacked adequate funding to implement the program. In
1979-1980, limited funding became available, and 66 trips were accompanied by
observers. Combined with trips observed by national programs (primarily the NMFS
observer program authorized by the MMPA at 16 U.S.C. § 1381(d) (1988)), 20.9% of

234

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:213

the IATTC has collected, analyzed and reported biological data,
conducted extensive studies to develop improved fishing techniques and

gear, presented seminars for fishermen to provide training and technical
advice concerning procedures designed to minimize dolphin mortality,
and carried out routine inspections of fishing equipment. 90 Finally, the

IATTC has worked closely with a number of groups including national
fisheries and fisheries-related organizations of member and non-member
nations; intergovernmental working groups consisting of both member
and non-member representatives; and international organizations, in its

effort to share information, encourage the adoption of dolphin-protective
regulations by participating nations, and develop effective internationally

cooperative mechanisms for enforcement of IATTC regulations. 9'
In 1990, members of the IATTC agreed "in principle" to work
toward reducing incidental dolphin mortality to levels approaching zero.'

For a number of members, however, this goal was somewhat in conflict
with another primary goal of the IATTC which was to manage yellowfin
tuna stocks for maximum yield consistent with conservation of the
ecosystem as a whole.'R According to one commentator, there was

concern that:
[c]hanging from fishing in international waters for the large,
sexually mature yellowfin usually found associated with dolphins

to fishing on logs and schools for predominantly smaller,

the fishing trips in 1979-80 were observed. Although hampered by funding problems,
the IATTC observer program grew. In 1991-92, IATTC observers accompanied 65%
of the eastern Pacific fishing trips. Combined with national observer programs, this
provided 98.1% observer coverage. Joseph, supra note 7 at 5.
90. Joseph, supra note 7, at 5-6.
91. For a detailed summary of IATTC activities, see id. at 4-6. For more
specific information, see CLIFFORD L. PETERSON & WILLIAM H. BAYLIFF, IATTC
SPECiALREPORT No. 5: ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTERAMERICANTROPICALTUNA COMMISSION (1985) [hereinafter IATTC ANNUAL REPORTS].
92. Joseph, supra note 7, at 10.
93. Only large mature tuna associate with dolphins. A prohibition on killing of
dolphins would require that the fishing effort concentrate on "dolphin-free" schoolsmostly small, sexually immature tuna. This shift would result in a large decrease in
efficiency and in overall production of yellowfin tuna. In addition, the increased harvest
of immature yellowfin could have a negative impact on future recruitment. Finally,
wasteful by-catch (mostly yellowfin tuna too small to have commercial value) would be
greatly increased, probably resulting in significant negative effects on yellowfin tuna
recruitment and on large pelagic predator and dolphin populations. Id. at 18-22.
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sexually immature yellowfin and skipjack tunas closer to shore
would, at current levels of effort, lead to overexploitation of the
resource and also give rise to political problems over access to
areas under national jurisdiction. 4
Nevertheless, negotiations continued, and at a meeting held in La
Jolla, California in June 1992, the IATTC agreed to establish a
multilateral dolphin conservation program (La Jolla Agreement).I The
program set a schedule for progressively decreasing total limits on
dolphin mortality to less than 5,000 per year in 1999, with a goal of
"eliminating dolphin mortality in the [eastern Pacific Ocean] fishery."96
The annual quota was to be divided among individual fishermen of all
participating nations. Addressing the economic and ecological concerns
mentioned above, this unique quota allocation system provides a great
incentive to reduce dolphin take without requiring a moratorium on
fishing on dolphins.'
The La Jolla Agreement also called for multilateral cooperation in
enforcement and research. An International Review Panel, made up of
representatives from participating governments, environmental groups,
and the fishing industry is charged with overseeing the quota program.
The panel monitors compliance and recommends measures to be taken
against individual vessels and nations violating the terms of the
agreement.9" Similarly, the agreement establishes a Scientific Advisory
Board to assist the IATTC Director in research designed to reduce
dolphin mortality and to develop alternative means of harvesting large
yellowfin tuna.99
The provisions of the La Jolla Agreement concerning the development of a multilateral program for reducing dolphin mortality, and the
establishment of the Review Panel and the Scientific Advisory Board are
consistent with actions mandated by the MMPA. Section 1378 of the
MMPA requires the Secretary to pursue international arrangements,
through the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; which provide

94. Id. at 10.
95. La Jolla Agreement, supranote 4, at 938.

96. Id.
97. A quota holder who for the most part successfully frees dolphins unharmed
may continue to harvest the large tuna, unless and until his dolphin quota is reached.
Joseph, supra note 7, at 11.
98. La Jolla Agreement, supranote 4, at 941.
99. Id. at 942.
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for cooperative research into methods of catching yellowfin tuna which
do not involve the taking of marine mammals, with a goal toward
approaching a zero dolphin mortality rate, as well as reliable monitoring
of the number, rate, and species of marine mammals taken by vessels of
harvesting nations."0t
III. THE INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION Acr OF 1992

It was against the backdrop of the successful negotiation of the 1992
La Jolla Agreement, court-ordered embargoes against primary and
intermediary nations exporting tuna to the United States, and the recently
issued GATT Panel's report concerning Mexico's appeal that Congress
considered two measures proposing a Dolphin Conservation Act as an
amendment to the MMPA. Both were aimed at reducing, and ultimately
eliminating, dolphin mortality associated with purse seining for yellowfin
tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Both measures acknowledged that
non-U.S. fishing vessels were responsible for an overwhelming majority
of these dolphin deaths, and provided for international research programs
to develop methods of fishing for large yellowfin tuna. However, the
two proposals had distinctly different approaches to dealing with dolphin
mortality while the research was underway.
A. The Breaux Bill

The first of these measures was sponsored by Senator Breaux of
Louisiana (the Breaux bill),'' and proposed to build on the considerable
cooperative efforts and negotiations of the IATTC.'" This bill would
have declared the policy of the United States to be the implementation
and enforcement of IATTC's La Jolla Agreement. 3 That Agreement,
as noted above, established quotas on dolphin take for the entire fleet in
the eastern Pacific Ocean, starting at 19,500 in 1993 and being
progressively reduced to less than 5000 per year by 1999, with the
ultimate goal being to "eliminat[e] dolphin mortality in this fishery.""
The bill proposed to direct the Secretary of State to seek and enter into
100.
7, at 12.
101.
102.
103.
104.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1378(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), (v) (1988). See also Joseph, supra note
S. 2995, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
S. 2995, supra note 101, at § 301(b)(3).
La Jolla Agreement, supra note 4, at 938.
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multilateral, international agreements to establish a program to protect
dolphins. These agreements would, among other things, reduce dolphin
mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean tuna fishery; eliminate such
mortality as soon as practicable; be consistent with the policies in the
MMPA;'05 recognize the need for multilateral agreement and cooperation
in achieving the objectives of dolphin conservation in the eastern Pacific
Ocean; encourage parties to the agreement to seek, through bilateral and
multilateral negotiations, to encourage other nations that participate in
fisheries to which the agreement applies, to become parties to the
agreement; and support the research program established under the
IATTC Agreement. 1 6
Under the Breaux bill, a moratorium on fishing on dolphins would
be considered if a "competent regional organization" (i.e., IATTC or
some counterpart) made a recommendation to that effect.'°0 Finally, the
bill would have provided for embargoes, similar to those ultimately adopted in the International Dolphin Conservation Act, upon a finding that
a nation which was a party to the international agreement was 10not
fully
8
implementing such nation's commitments under the agreement.
B. The Studds Bill
The other bill, sponsored by Congressman Studds of Massachusetts
(the Studds bill), called for a five year moratorium on fishing on
dolphins.'1 9 Under this bill, the Secretary of State can negotiate bilateral
agreements with other tuna fishing nations." 0 Such agreements would
allow the lifting of trade sanctions from those nations which agreed to
continue to reduce dolphin mortality"' These nations would also be
required to suspend fishing on dolphin for at least five years beginning
March 1, 1994.12 In the event that a nation failed to so agree, or failed

105. See supranote 100 and accompanying text demonstrating that the provisions
of the La Jolla Agreement were consistent with MMPA mandates.
106. S. 2995, supranote 101, at § 302.
107. Id. § 304(b).
108. Id. § 305(a).
109. H.R. 5419, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (version: 2) (1992). A companion bill was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. S. 3003, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992).
110. H.R. 5419, supra note 109 at § 302(a).
111. Id. § 304(b).
112. Id. § 305 (a)(1).
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to live up to its commitment after a treaty to this effect was signed, the
United States would impose sanctions on that nation."' These sanctions
included a ban on the importation of all tuna, tuna products, and with the
exception of shrimp and shrimp products, all other other fish products
from the offending nation."'
The Studds bill was ultimately adopted by Congress as the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992 (IDCA)." 5 In its final version,
the IDCA called for the negotiation of bilateral agreements with major
purse-seine tuna fishing countries to establish the global moratorium.
The moratorium was to last at least five years" 6 and prohibited the
harvest of tuna through the use of purse-seine nets deployed on or used
to encircle dolphins or other marine mammals. Any country that
transmits to the Secretary of State a formal communication committing
to implement a moratorium, require observers on all large vessels purseseining for tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean, and reduce dolphin
mortality resulting from purse-seining by statistically significant margins

in 1992 and 1993, will be exempted from the MMPA's import ban." 7
The Secretary is directed to periodically determine whether each

country transmitting such a formal communication is implementing the
commitments. If the Secretary finds that the country is not, then an
import ban is to be put in place within 15 days. If the country does not
provide reasonable proof that it has fully implemented its commitments

113. Id. § 305 (b)(1).
114. Id. § 305 (b)(2).
115. See supra note 5.
116. The IDCA does provide an avenue of early escape: the moratorium may be
terminated prior to December 31, 1999, with respect to the United States for the
harvesting of tuna in the eastern Pacific, only if (1) a recommendation for termination
is submitted to the Secretary of Commerce by "a competent regional organization under
the auspices of which research is conducted" concerning the development of methods of
fishing for large yellowfin tuna, 16 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993)
(2) the Secretary reviews the information on which the recommendation is based, in
consultation with relevant Federal agencies and other interested persons, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1414(b)(1), (b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993) (3) the Secretary submits to
Congress a recommendation regarding the termination of the moratorium, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1412(c) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993) and (4) the recommendation is approved by
enactment of a joint resolution of approval. Id.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
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within 60 days of the beginning of the ban, an even harsher embargo will
be imposed."'
For U.S. fishermen, the IDCA limits the American Tunaboat
Association's (ATA) general permit to a quota of incidental dolphin take
(including those taken for research) to 1000 for 1992, and 800 for a 15
month period beginning January 1, 199319

On March 1, 1994, the

ATA's general permit would expire, unless no major purse-seine tuna
fishing country had entered into the above-described agreement by that
date."2 In that case, the permit will not expire until 1999, but dolphin
mortalities for each year may not exceed the prior year's mortality
figure, and that number must be reduced by statistically significant
amounts each year, to levels approaching zero by 1999.121

Thus, two different outcomes are possible under the IDCA. First,
if at least one "major purse-seine tuna fishing country"' " agrees to
implement a moratorium on fishing on dolphins, then U.S. fishermen
will also be subject to a moratorium, and yellowfin tuna and tuna
products from all major fishing countries not instituting a moratorium
will be embargoed." On the other hand, if no major tuna purse-seining
country enters into the agreement with the United States, imports from
all such countries will be subject to embargoes of yellowfin tuna or tuna
products unless their tuna purse-seiners' average rate of incidental taking
is comparable to the new rates set for U.S. fishermen under the IDCA. 24
Either way, the United States is using its power to impose economic
sanctions to coerce adoption of the dolphin protection goals that it has
unilaterally determined to be appropriate.

118. 16 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993). In such case, the
President is directed to impose a ban on importation of all fish and fish products that the
President considers "appropriate," according to certain criteria. Id.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
122. A "major purse seine tuna fishing country" is defined as "a country which on
October 26, 1992, has an active purse seine tuna fishing fleet of 20 or more vessels."
16 U.S.C. § 1416(c) (Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
123. As noted above, a country that continues to refuse to implement a moratorium
will ultimately be subject to a ban of all fish and fish products. 16 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1992 & Supp. V 1993).
124. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)()-(V) (1988). Intermediary nations, of
course, will still be subject to embargoes if they do not prohibit the importation of any
tuna product that is prohibited from importation into the United States.

240

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:213

It appears that the lifting of tuna import bans was intended to meet
U.S. responsibilities under GATT."
The legislative history of the
IDCA demonstrates that Congress was very concerned about resolving
the issues raised by Mexico and saw the unilateral provisions of the
IDCA as a method of quickly dealing with those concerns. 1" Although
the history also includes a discussion of the merits of the La Jolla
Agreement 27 and a strong dissent to the adoption of the committee report
by Representative Cunningham," 2 no other explanation is offered in the
report as to why the Studds IDCA approach was deemed preferable to
the multilateral approach reflected in the Breaux bill. It does not appear
that the broader international law obligations the United States has under
either the law of the sea or other international treaties were considered
prior to the passage of the IDCA.
IV. TUNA EMBARGOES AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA

At first glance, the two approaches to resolving the tuna-dolphin
controversy presented by the Breaux bill and the IDCA as finally enacted
seem similar. The objective of both measures was to eliminate dolphin
mortality associated with yellowfin tuna fishing. Both would have
required the United States to impose economic sanctions on countries
unwilling to cooperate toward this end. However, one significant
difference distinguished the two. The Breaux bill would have had the
United States enforce the La Jolla Agreement, a multinationally-agreed
upon program designed to solve the dolphin mortality problem. In
contrast, the IDCA, a unilateral attempt by the United States to enforce
dolphin protection through embargoes imposed pursuant to the MMPA,
works to enforce a stark protectionist measure.
As previously noted, analysis of the approaches requires consideration of questions concerning how a nation should work toward solving
an international problem. The answers to these questions can be found
by first evaluating the two approaches in terms of the principles of the
new law of the sea, and then by examining the effect of MMPA
embargoes on the international legal order.

125. See discussion supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
126. 138 CONG. REc. H9064, 9069 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (statement of Rep.

Crane).
127. H.R. REP. No. 746 (pt. I), supranote 18, at 2924-2925; H.R. REP. No. 746
(pt. 1I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2941-2942.
128. H.R. REP. No. 746 (pt. I), supra note 18, at 2938-2939.
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The two approaches reflect the diverging paths the United States has
been travelling when considering an issue of international importance.
By selecting the IDCA rather than the Breaux bill, the United States has
endorsed a unilateral approach that does not incorporate considerations
of the rest of the world community. This approach is not consistent with
principles adopted by either the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea or the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, and because it was not the result of international
cooperation, but rather a unilateral action, the IDCA has been criticized
by both the European Community, and the Latin America tuna fishing
states.
An underlying tenet of international law is the desirability of
negotiation, cooperation, and consent in matters of common interest
beyond state borders. International norms emerge from the interaction
of nations participating as politically equal sovereigns: negotiation' of
treaties and conventions, customary practice engaged in or condoned by
many nations, and the decisions of the International Court of Justice in
disputes submitted for resolution are all sources of international law
based on the basic principle of consent.
There are neither specific international treaties,' 29 nor decisional law
regarding the protection of dolphins. State practice on the issue varies
widely-while some nations actively attempt to protect dolphins, many
do not; and there is no generally recognized custom of doing so.
Therefore, the most relevant international law concerning dolphin
protection must be found under the rubric of high seas fishing, and
through conservation of ocean resources under the Law of the Sea
Convention and UNCED.

129. Earth Island Institute has suggested that the International Whaling Commission
(1WC), established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling of
1946, (161 U.N.T.S. 72 Dec. 2, 1946), has broad powers to designate certain species
of whales, and therefore could appropriately regulate the killing of dolphins. Stephen

Boreman, Dolphin-Safe Tuna: What's in a Label? The Killing of Dolphins in the Eastern
TropicalPacific and the Casefor an InternationalLegal Solution, 32 NAT. RFSOURCES

J. 425, 439 (1992) (citing Steiner, et. aL, The Tragedy Continues: Killing of Dolphins
by the Tuna Industry, EarthIslandInstitute 11 (1988)). The IWC, however, has made
the conscious choice not to "dilute its basic mission" with added concerns about the
international tuna industry and the killing of eastern Pacific Ocean dolphins. Id.
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A. High Seas Fishing
Freedom of fishing on the high seas is a long-standing principle of
international law. From far back in history, fish stocks in the waters
beyond the territorial seas of coastal states have been considered a

common resource, to be freely harvested. Historically, all harvesting of
fish in the ocean has been subject only to those controls flag states have
chosen to impose on their fishing vessels, and to those few measures
necessary to respect the equal rights of other harvesters.

Not until fairly recently did nations begin to recognize that the
oceans' bountiful living resources were not without limit.'

Technologi-

cal advances made it possible for nations to profitably fish in distant
fishing grounds. Development of fisheries offered promise of economic

growth. Moreover, as the unprecedented population boom of the 20th
century created an equally unprecedented demand for food, people turned
to the sea. As a result, new, larger, and more efficient fishing vessels
and techniques were developed, such as large ocean-going fishing
trawlers and seiners tended by huge factory freezer ships that could stay
at sea for months. Such increased pressure on ocean fish stocks raised

concerns for their management.'

These concerns led to a dramatic

change in the scope of high seas fishing freedoms,

now articulated in

130. For an analysis of the transition from the open ocean system to relative
scarcity of many ocean resources, see THE NEw ORDER OF THE OCEANS: THE ADvENT
OF A MANAGED ENVIRONMENT 6-7 (Giulio Pontecorvo ed., 1986).
131. WILLIAM T. BURKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 3-1 (1992).
132. Until the 1970s, coastal nations had exercised control over the resources only
in their territorial seas. Generally, in the early 1970s, the accepted limit on the
territorial sea was 12 miles; a few states recognized only 3- or 6-mile territorial seas,
which had been the norm for preceding centuries. Id.
This concept of limited coastal control was abandoned in the 1970s and early 1980s
with the widespread adoption of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, under
which coastal nations have sovereign authority to manage the ocean resources out to 200
miles from their shores. Increased fishing pressure beyond the territorial sea had taken
its toll on fish stocks, prompting coastal nations to take control of resource management
beyond the traditional limit, in order to conserve the resources within its borders. See
id. at 3-1-3-27. (For various reasons, international agreements establishing multinational regulatory bodies had proved to be ineffective in regulating and enforcing
meaningful management of these resources. See id. at 3-6, for a discussion of the
difficulties of multinational regulatory institutions.) See also BEAN, supra note 34, at
386-387.
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the Law of the Sea Convention (LOS).'
The LOS sets forth accepted international law regarding management
of resources including: straddling stocks,"M anadromous stocks,' 35 highly
migratory (fish) species, 31 marine mammals, 37 and other living ocean
resources.3 8 The articles of the LOS applicable to the tuna/dolphin
problem show a clear preference for conservation and management
programs developed through international effort and cooperation, calling
for nations to work through "appropriate" regional or international

organizations.

9

B. PrinciplesEmbodied in the High Seas Provisions
of the Law of the Sea Convention
Under LOS Article 116, the nationals of all states have the right to
engage in fishing for tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean outside the EEZs
of coastal states. These fishing rights are limited by 1) the respective

133. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signatureDec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/122, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
LOS].
134. LOS, supra note 133, art. 63, at 1282.
135. LOS, supra note 133, art. 66, at 1282.
136. LOS, supra note 133, art. 64, at 1282.
137. LOS, supra note 133, arts. 65, 120, at 1282, 1291.
138. LOS, supra note 133, arts. 117-119, at 1291. The LOS represents an
"overhaul" and rewriting of international law regarding coastal state control, distant
water fishing states' rights, and obligations for conservation of living marine resources.
The LOS is the result of intense negotiations culminating in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. For a general discussion of the progress made on
various law of the sea issues during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, see John R. Stevenson & BernardH. Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of
the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 CaracasSession, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); and
Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1976 New York Session, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977); The 1977New York Sessions,
72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979);
The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980); Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 211 (1981); The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. 3. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
A good source on developments in the law of the sea can be found in annual SAN
DIEGO L. REV. issues starting with Volume 6 in 1968-1969. The articles detail emerging
issues, chart the progress of UNCLOS III negotiations and parallel law of the sea issues,
and offer insights as to the makeup of the law of the sea, post-UNCLOS I.
139. LOS, supra note 133, arts. 64, 65, 118 and 119, at 1282, 1291.
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flag state's treaty obligations; 2) any rights, duties and interests of the
coastal states; and 3) other provisions of the Convention regarding
conservation and management of high seas fishery resources.140
1.

Interests of Coastal States

The "rights, duties and interests of coastal states" are those which
states have by virtue of the fact that both yellowfin tuna and the dolphins
with which they associate may be found within their Exclusive Economic
Zones. Under the LOS Part V, the provisions on the Exclusive
Economic Zone, coastal states have both the right and the duty to
provide adequate management of all living resources within their
EEZs.'41 This is true whether or not a coastal state participates in the
harvest of such resources. Under the LOS Article 64, coastal states also
have a duty to cooperate directly or through appropriate international
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory species throughout
the region, both within and beyond the EEZ. 42 Again, coastal states
have this obligation whether or not their nationals harvest the species.
Thus, under the LOS, the coastal states bordering the eastern Pacific
Ocean have both duties and interests in reducing dolphin by-catch in the
tuna fisheries. Fishing regulations or management plans must be adopted
in cooperation with, and subject to the interests of, the coastal states. 43
The IDCA calls for negotiation of either bilateral or multilateral
treaties to effect dolphin protection in the eastern Pacific Ocean.
However, because the Act also calls for the imposition of strict
embargoes against states that refuse to adopt the moratorium desired by
the United States, the Act cannot be considered to propose cooperation
with other coastal states or distant fishing states having an interest in the
tuna and the dolphins.
The Breaux bill, on the other hand, would have implemented an
agreement reached between coastal states and other states involved in the
eastern Pacific Ocean tuna fishery. Although the willingness of some
states to reach agreement may have been influenced by U.S. embargoes

140.
144-155.
141.
142.
143.

The provisions include Articles 117 through 120. See discussion infra notes
LOS, supra note 133, arts. 56-75, at 1280-1284.
LOS, supra note 133, art. 64, at 1282.
LOS, supra note 133, art. 58, at 1280.
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or the threat thereof, the La Jolla Agreement was nonetheless the result
of negotiations during which the interests and needs of all the participating states were considered. Furthermore, in contrast to those of the
IDCA, the Breaux bill's proposed economic sanction6 would be used
against states that refused to adopt a management plan comparable to one
cooperatively developed by a multinational organization, a plan in which
all interested states had an opportunity to put forth their interests and
concerns and to negotiate compromises.
2. Duty of All States to Cooperate
LOS Article 117 provides that: "[a]ll States have the duty to adopt,
or to co-operate with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the
living resources of the high seas." 44 Under this Article, it is clear that
the United States has both the right and the duty to adopt such regulations as it deems appropriate for U.S. fishermen, to ensure that dolphin
populations are properly protected from harmful activities by U.S.
nationals.
The duty of cooperation is expanded in Article 118 which states that:
States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and
management of living resources in the areas of the high seas.
States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or
different living resources in the same area, shall enter into
negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the
conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as
appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional or regional
fisheries organizations to this end. 45
Under Article 118, then, the United States has the duty to cooperate with
other states engaged in purse-seine fishing in the eastern Pacific Ocean
to develop conservation measures for dolphins. In working to establish
the IATTC, and in working through the IATTC, supporting research and
developing management goals, the United States has attempted to carry
out this duty. By including an international program in the MMPA,
,hereby the Secretary was directed to negotiate agreements with other

144. LOS, supra note 133, art. 117, at 1291.
145. LOS, supra note 133, art. 118, at 1291.
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countries for the protection and conservation of marine mammals,146 the
United States was further responding to international obligations, actively
putting its concerns and interests on the negotiating table.
However, the gradual shift in emphasis of the MMPA to a position
mandating a moratorium approach to the dolphin by-catch problem, and
the use of powerful economic sanctions to force international acceptance
of that approach, is in contravention of Article 118. States that may
have been willing to negotiate and compromise, as is the case with the
nine countries that agreed to the La Jolla Agreement, are cut off from
discussion. Their only options are to accept the "American compromise"
(hammered out between competing U.S. interests), or to protect their
own interests but be deprived of the U.S. market. Under international
law, cooperation does not mean that the economically strongest state may
determine all the rules, even if that state purports to be acting in the
overall best interests of all.
Supporters of the IDCA may argue that an economic sanctions
approach is necessary in order to save species of dolphin that are
threatened with irreparable harm. While considerable disagreement may
exist as to exact population counts, optimum sustainable population levels
and other scientific data, no scientific report claims that zero dolphin
mortality is required for the healthy maintenance of the species.
3. Factors to be Considered in Management Programs
In addition to the duties of consideration and cooperation articulated
in Articles 117 and 118, Article 119 provides specific factors which must
be considered when developing conservation measures for living
resources in the high seas. Paragraph 1(a) of that Article states that
management of harvested species should take into account relevant
economic factors, including the special requirements of developing states.
This is consistent with the overall approach of LOS, which reflects a
balancing of conservation requirements with economic needs, particularly
those of developing states. Although the IDCA was enacted to protect
dolphins and was not designed with the intent to manage any "harvested
species," factors relating to other countries' economic needs are still
relevant in dolphin management decisions. Such factors may not be
ignored by the United States.

146. See supra Part I(1).
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Article 119 paragraph 1(b) provides a norm that is particularly
relevant to the dolphin by-catch problem. Under this provision, states
are required to maintain or restore species "associated with" the
harvested species to populations "above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. "147 The IDCA's requirement that

dolphin mortality be reduced to zero in 1994 goes beyond this 'norm
unless any dolphin mortality level above zero would "seriously threaten"
reproductive rates. Over the past 5 years, with a mortality figure
averaging around 100,000 per year,"4 indicators of dolphin stock size
have shown no statistically significant trend in populations. 49 The La
Jolla Agreement sets an initial mortality limit of 19,500 in 1993, and in
subsequent years, quotas would be gradually reduced from that figure °
There is no scientific indication that these quotas would seriously
threaten dolphin reproductive rates. Therefore, international law does
not support the particular goal that the IDCA mandates.
4. Special ConsiderationsRegardingMarine Mammals
Articles 65 and 12011 of the LOS 'give special recognition to the
desire of some nations to manage marine'mammals. However, this does
not mean that one nation may unilaterally demand a stricter standard of

6.1).

147. LOS, supra note 133, art. 119(1)(b), at 1291.
148. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 176, (afithor's estimate derived from Table
'

"

149. Id. at 118.
150. See La Jolla Agreement, supra note 4,' at 938. The IATTC has already
revised these quotas downward. Noting the significant progress toward reaching the
Dolphin Mortality Limits prescribed in the La Jolla Agreement, the IATTC adopted a
Resolution on October 27, 1993, to set the 1994 quota at 9300, and will continue to
review the original schedule "with the objective of determining whether reductions in that
schedule can be achieved." Id. at 936.
151. Article 65 provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the
competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit
or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided
for in this Part. States shall co-operate with a view to the conservation of
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through
the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management
and study.
LOS, supranote 133, art. 65, at 1282. Article 120 provides, "Article 65 also applies
to the conservation and management of marine mammals in the high seas." LOS, supra
note 133, art. 120, at 1291.
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regulation. In the LOS, the entire High Seas section,"s as well as the
articles concerning straddling stocks,' highly migratory species" 54 and
marine mammals 55 all point to nations' duties to cooperate in establishing management plans, and, where appropriate, to establish and work
through regional fisheries organizations to this end. Thus, under Article
120, it would be permissible to require zero incidental dolphin mortality
in the eastern Pacific tuna fishery. For such a requirement to be
consistent with the LOS, however, it must have been agreed upon
through good faith negotiation and agreement within a regional or
international organization.
Both the IDCA and the Breaux bill had "zero mortality" as an
ultimate goal. In pursuing this goal, the IDCA fails to conform to
principles of international law; it unilaterally imposes a dolphin
management scheme. In contrast, the Breaux bill's approach would have
relied on the IATTC's multilaterally agreed-upon plan for achievement
of the goal, therefore conforming to international law principles.
C. UNCED Principles
The IDCA may also fall short of emerging principles of international
environmental law beyond the LOS. At the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June,
1992 (UNCED), two documents were adopted. The Agreement on
Environment and Development'56 is a charter of environmental principles
which had been negotiated in pre-summit conferences. Agenda 21" is
a detailed blueprint for the next century, laying out internationally
accepted guidelines for dealing with global environmental problems. It
had been jointly created by representatives from over 100 nations.

152. LOS, supra note 133, pt. VII, at 1286-1291.
153. LOS, supra note 133, art. 63, at 1282.
154. LOS, supra note 133, art. 64, at 1282.
155. LOS, supra note 133, arts. 65, 120, at 1282, 1291.
156. UNCED Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874, 876
(1992) [hereinafter UNCED Doc.].
157. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Dept. of Public
Information, Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and SemiEnclosed Seas, and CoastalAreas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of
Their Living Resources (ch. 17, advance copy 1993) (available from U.N. Department
of Public Information, 160 Route de Fiorissant, P.O. Box 80 CH-1231, Conches,
Switzerland) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
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Principle 12 of the Declaration of Principles states: "[u]nilateral
actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of
the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures
addressing ... global environment[al] concerns should, as far as possible,

be based on an international consensus.""' s The IDCA is inconsistent
with this principle. Despite its language calling for bilateral and
multilateral treaties, the IDCA's imposition of sanctions on those nations
that do not agree to unilaterally determined terms is, in effect, a
unilateral action. The Breaux bill, in contrast, proposed action based on
international, or at least multinational, consensus, and hence was
consistent with Principle 12.
Agenda 21's chapter 17 deals with protection, rational use and
development of living resources of the oceans. This chapter, like the
LOS, calls for nations to commit themselves to the conservation and
sustainable use of living resources of the high seas,'59 and to take
"effective action, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation ... to
ensure that high seas fisheries are managed in accordance with the
provisions of the [LOS]. '' "
Section 17.47 of Chapter 17 specifically refers to the conservation
of marine mammals.' Like the LOS Articles 65 and 120, this section
provides that nothing in the chapter restricts the rights of nations to
"prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals" more
strictly than other ocean resources. 62 However, the section continues,
"States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine
mammals, and in the case of cetaceans, shall in particular work through
the appropriate international organizations."
Section 17.62 recognizes
64
the work of the IATTC in this regard.
Thus, the principles set forth in the LOS were re-endorsed as
international policy objectives in Agenda 21. Again, because it would
have served to implement and strengthen a multinational agreement, the
Breaux bill was consistent with these objectives. In contrast, the IDCA
ignores the duty to cooperate.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

UNCED Doc., supra note 156, at 878.
Agenda 21, supra note 157, at 18.
Id. § 17.49, at 18-19. See also id. §§ 17.58 and 17.60, at 20.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. See also id. § 17.63, at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
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D. The InternationalLegal Order

In amending the MMPA with the International Dolphin Conservation
Act of 1992, Congress exercised its duty to define policy and legislate
in the interests of the United States. Clearly, it is in the United States'
interest, from the standpoints of ethics, economics, and science, to solve
the problem of wasteful dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific tuna
fishery. However, dolphin conservation is not the only interest to be
considered in adopting legislation that has implications beyond U.S.
borders. The United States has a broader interest in a stable, predictable
international legal order.
Over the centuries, sovereign states have come to acknowledge the
value of a principle recognizing legal equality among states in the
international community.'1
As much as possible, decisions with
international implications are made by states negotiating and consenting
as political equals. Though sometimes more an aspiration than a reality,
this principle serves to provide stability in international affairs,
particularly in economic relations.
Unfortunately, by adopting the moratorium-embargo approach rather
than promoting implementation of IATTC's La Jolla Agreement, the
United States has chosen to follow a "might makes right" approach to
solving an international problem, ignoring the interests of other sovereign
states. Apart from its failure to acknowledge the demands of international law, this approach may not even work. Over the last five years,
some of the Latin American nations have begun to develop alternative
markets for their tuna." These nations may decide they can do without
the U.S. market. On the other hand, they may bow to the economic
pressure of the U.S. approach. In the long run, however, the unilateral
sanctions approach is likely to be counterproductive in the broader scope
of international relations.
The embargoes against Mexico and Venezuela, required under the
MMPA because those states did not prove the existence of a "comparable" dolphin protection scheme, stirred international resentment. Not
only were the embargoes found to be in contravention of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), of which the United States is

165. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (1988)
(citing Lachs, The Development and GeneralTrends of InternationalLaw in our Time,
169 HAGUE RECUEIL 9, 77-84 (1980)).
166. Joseph, supra note 7, at 15.
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a signatory, 67 but they have also further inflamed the sentiment of
Mexico and of developing countries in Central and South America.
These countries are now claiming that the United States is engaged in
economic protectionism masked by "ecological arguments."1'
The
embargo provisions of the MMPA, including the strict provisions of the
IDCA, have increased friction over trade, and complicated NAFTA
negotiations.
These complications and frictions could have been avoided had
Congress adopted the Breaux bill, promoting the implementation of the
La Jolla Agreement. That approach was supported not just by Mexico
and Venezuela, but by all the major countries involved. in the fishery.
Indeed, in June 1993 six supporters of the IATTC issued a joint
declaration exhorting the United States to recognize the successful
achievement of an international agreement for the conservation of
dolphins, and to lift the tuna embargoes imposed under the MMPA. 69
Generally concerned about unilateral actions used to force the
adoption of certain policies, the European Community (EC) has
expressed its disapproval of the U.S. embargo approach to the dolphin
by-catch problem in the Pacific tuna fisheries. Joining other entities in
calling for the GATT council to rule on the actions of the United States,
spokespersons for the EC noted, "Not only are the U.S. measures
unilateral and extraterritorial in nature; they also actually require third
countries to act in breach of their GATT obligations."17

167. Mexico had requested that the Council of the GATT convene a Dispute
Settlement Panel, contending that the MMPA embargo provisions violated GATT
provisions. The Panel held in favor of Mexico. See Eric Christiansen & Samantha
Gaffin, GATT Sets its Net on Environmental Regulation: The GA2T Panel Ruling on
Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the InternationalTrading
System, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 569, 575 (1992).
168. PointofAgreement on the Tuna Embargoofthe PermanentCommission of the
Mexican Congress, COMISION DE PESCA, 2,6 (Sept. 14, 1992) (on file with Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal).
169. Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu and Venezuela adopted the
declaration during an intergovernmental meeting on June 9, 1993. IATTC, QUARTERLY
REPORT: Apr.-June 1993, 14 (1993).

170. Statement released by 1992 Commission of the European Communities,
Community Request for a GATT panel on the U.S. Unilateral Tuna Embargo, RAPID,
June 19, 1992 available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, RAPID File. In May 1994, a
GATT dispute resolution panel ruled that the U.S. tuna embargoes were inconsistent with
U.S. GATT obligations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Panel Report - United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994). The United States is
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The EC stressed that it was the unilateral nature of the position of
the United States, and not the U.S. concern for incidental dolphin
mortality, that gave rise to its criticism. Indeed, the EC supports
international efforts to provide protection to cetaceans and to establish
responsible fishing practices. The EC specifically expressed full support
for current efforts by the IATTC to protect dolphins.'17 Hence, the
passage of the Breaux bill would have satisfied the concerns of the EC,
and may have helped to alleviate U.S.-EC economic tensions.
The United States has a broad range of interests in international
affairs from trade, to humanitarian concerns, to environmental protection. It cannot afford to be seen as the "bully on the block," more
interested in promoting its own agenda than in building multinational
support for its concerns. Moreover, it must be remembered that
concerns about the dolphin by-catch problem are the result of years of
internal political battles over environmental policies.
The world
community cannot be expected to come to share the same perspective
without a similar opportunity for dialogue. To be a credible player in
negotiation and consensus-building over these issues, the United States
must patiently cooperate with other interested nations and avoid unilateral
actions that have no support in the world community.
V. CONCLUSION

In enacting the International Dolphin Conservation Act rather than
the Breaux bill, Congress has missed two opportunities. First, the
chance to provide real protection for dolphins in the eastern Pacific
Ocean may have been lost. Some nations may agree at first to observe
the moratorium, simply to preserve access to the U.S. market.
However, if alternative markets open up, those nations may abandon the
moratorium because they have no stake in its continued observance. In
contrast, the nations that worked to hammer out the compromise
represented by IATTC's La Jolla Agreement do have a stake in its
success as it is their agreement. That agreement may fall apart if,
despite concessions made by other nations in negotiations leading up to

seeking reconsideration of the panel's decision by the GATT Council. EU, Japan, Call
on U.S. to Implement Ruling Against U.S. Tuna Embargo Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA), 1179,
July 27, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
171. EU, Japan, Call on U.S. to Implement Ruling Against U.S. Tuna Embargo,
supra note 170.
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the agreement, the United States closes its markets to their fish products.
Avoidance of the moratorium due to the availability of alternative
markets, coupled with the collapse of the La Jolla Agreement would be
a step backward in dolphin protection.
Even more important, though, is the second opportunity missedthat of promoting a stable international world order by setting an
example of international cooperation in dealing with a complex
conservation issue. Customary international law, the LOS and Agenda
21 all call for the cooperation of interested nations in conserving global
resources. This ideal has become increasingly difficult to achieve as the
pressure on these resources mount. The United States cannot afford to
set a precedent of economic coercion as the basis for problem solving,
especially where there is no emergency and a solution based on
negotiation and cooperation is so close at hand.

